Column: New Jewish Narrative
May 18, 2026
Q. You are a former Mossad official, with Shin Bet experience as well. What is wrong or at least unusual with those appointments?
A. On the face of it, Prime Minister Netanyahu has appointed startlingly underqualified or even ‘misqualified’ junior generals to head the Mossad, the Israeli equivalent of the CIA, and the Shin Bet (from herein we’ll use the designation Shabak, the up-to-date Hebrew acronym for the Israeli domestic intelligence service). Neither general has previous intelligence experience or training. One, David Zini (Shabak), makes no secret of his messianic leanings and their influence on his decision-making. The other, Roman Gofman (Mossad), is Netanyahu’s military aide.
Q. These are not the first IDF generals to head Israel’s civilian intelligence establishment. Netanyahu is not the first prime minister to make high-level security appointments based on loyalty and political ideology.
A. To clarify: Zini has been serving as Shabak head for some six months already, having overcome on the way allegations concerning his extreme religious orientation and his brother’s alleged involvement in smuggling to Gaza. Gofman’s appointment is currently the subject of an appeal to the High Court to block it, based on accusations of convoluted manipulations on his part in the latter stages of his military career.
In both cases--like it or not--the hiccups en route to taking office, while unsavory and even bizarre, are not unusual in Israel these days as ambitious people climb to the top of the security or public service pyramid. Since taking office, Zini has managed to insult the many women--nearly half--who serve in the Shabak by refusing to shake their hands and by allowing his wife to send a clumsy letter of greeting to the wives of Shabak men but not to Shabak women.
Note too that there is a lot of déjà vu here. Generals elevated in the past to head the civilian security services--men like Meir Amit and Yitzhak Hofi in the Mossad and Ami Ayalon in the Shin Bet --on the whole performed favorably, often with distinction. Without exception they had to pass political-ideological muster with the serving prime minister, for the most part back in the day when Palmach service prior to 1948 meant loyalty to the Labor establishment founding fathers and (Golda Meir) mother. In some cases they had no appreciable intelligence background and had to learn on the job how the Mossad or Shabak operate. At least one, Zamir, went on to participate directly in a Mossad operation.
Yossi Alpher's Death Tango: Ariel Sharon, Yasser Arafat and Three Fateful Days in March
"Anyone seeking to understand how Israelis and Palestinians traded the hopes of Oslo for something approaching hopelessness is well-advised to read this book. With penetrating analysis and elegant prose, Yossi Alpher has told the gripping story of three days nearly two decades ago that continue to haunt would-be peacemakers. Yossi’s faithful readers will not be disappointed with his latest effort."
Ambassador Frederic C. Hof, Bard College
"A riveting account of the crucial days in March 2002 when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was profoundly changed for the worse. The peace camp has never recovered from those wrenching days, and we live now without any hope of a just settlement. Alpher is a highly respected expert who has spent decades studying this conflict from both sides."
Bruce Riedel, Director of the Brookings Intelligence Project
"A critical assessment of a key period in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict never before presented in such detail. The best and most capable players at the executive and political levels proved unable to forge any resolution, final or partial, because both parties continued to maintain an insurmountable gulf between themselves. This is a MUST read for anyone daring to tackle the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and of Israel-Arab relations in general."
Efraim Halevy, former Head of the Mossad (1998-2002)
Oraib Khader and Avi Bar-On are youngish Palestinian and Israeli bachelors with security experience, readiness to do business with one another, a shared fondness for women and money, and total cynicism about the lack of peace between their two peoples.
Oraib and Avi can never become true friends: the cultural and political gaps are too wide. But as they confront a failed peace process and a bleak peace future, they readily become business partners: shady business that exploits a lot of naïve international peace aspirations.
As Oraib sums up on a visit to Sarpsborg, Norway, where the ultimately-failed Oslo peace talks were held, “There is a lesson here for those who still doggedly and hopelessly pursue a two-state solution in the Middle East. Get smart. Get out of the Israeli-Palestinian peace business. Step back and let the Jews and Arabs screw one another while making money.”